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This paper examines some of the implications for China of the creative industries 
agenda as drawn by some recent commentators.  The creative industries have been 
seen by many commentators as essential if China is to move from an imitative low-
value economy to an innovative high value one. Some suggest that this trajectory is 
impossible without a full transition to liberal capitalism and democracy - not just 
removing censorship but instituting 'enlightenment values'. Others suggest that the 
development of the creative industries themselves will promote social and political 
change. The paper suggests that the creative industries takes certain elements of a 
prior cultural industries concept and links it to a new kind of economic development 
agenda. Though this agenda presents problems for the Chinese government it does 
not in itself imply the kind of radical democratic political change with which these 
commentators associate it. In the form in which the creative industries are presented 
– as part of an informational economy rather than as a cultural politics – it can be 
accommodated by a Chinese regime doing ‘business as usual’. 
 
Keywords: Creative industries; Cultural industries; China; consumption; 
entrepreneurship; modernity 
 
This paper is concerned with the process of international policy transfer around the 
creative industries as it specifically applies to China. Such policy discourses are never 
merely technical, and especially not in a field as ambiguous, contested and malleable 
as the creative industries. As a number of commentators have shown, the ‘creative 
industries’ have been picked up by different governments in different ways according 
to local needs – some structural and others merely transitory (Wang, 2004; Kong et al, 
2006; Cunningham, 2009). Here we look at some of the narratives within which this 
particular policy discourse is embedded. Parts of this narrative are clearly visible, 
other aspects lie below the surface. In the first part of this paper I attempt to identify 
what might differentiate a ‘creative industries’ discourse as opposed to that of a prior 
‘cultural industries’. The latter derives from a critical ‘political economy’ school of 
cultural and media studies but it is also had a more positive cultural policy agenda 
rooted in the new left and urban social movements of the post-68 period. I suggest 
that the creative industries discourse takes much of the emancipatory rhetoric from 
this tradition but that ultimately it becomes a politics of creative consumption. In the 
second part I explore this through the lens of some different views of the prospects for 
the creative industries in China.  
 
Creativity as Innovation 
 
The direct provenance of the creative industries discourse is, on the one hand, fairly 
straightforward – it derives (via the Australian Labour Government’s Creative Nation 
initiative) from the UK Government Department of Culture, Media and Sport’s 
  
Creative Industries Mapping Document (DCMS 1998). On the other hand, the 
resonances of this newly named policy object are strongly contested. Some (including 
this author) have emphasised its connection to the previous ‘cultural industries’, 
which as an academic and policy field goes back at least to the 1960s (Banks, 2007; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2007; O’Connor, 2007). From this perspective the notion of ‘creative 
industries’ has been deemed an opportunist and a confusing misnomer (Garnham, 
2005; Pratt, 2005; Hesmondhalgh, 2007; O’Connor, 2009; 2010), and often held to 
signal a radical shift from the cultural to the economic end of the policy value 
spectrum (Banks and O’Connor, 2009).  
 
For others however the creative industries discourse is a radical break with ‘arts and 
cultural industries’. First this discourse claims a more democratic move from top-
down publicly subsidised to bottom up market-led culture. This is linked to claims 
that the proliferation of Web 2.0 technologies have undermined the role of the big 
‘culture industry’ corporations, extended the active influence of consumers within the 
production process (‘prosumption’, ‘co-creation’, new forms of user-led aggregation 
and feedback mechanisms) and generally opened up the field of digital creative 
practice through cheaper and more user-friendly technologies (Hartley, 2005; 2008; 
Cunningham, 2005).  
 
Second (and despite the above), continued public investment in the creative industries 
is justified, primarily as economic policy. However, this is not simply in terms of the 
direct employment and wealth creation of this sector – a claim shared by the cultural 
industries policy discourse and one which still animates most national and local 
government creative industry strategies. Just as the cultural industries had other public 
good outcomes – various contributions to cultural and social life – the creative 
industries contribute to the ‘innovation system’ of the economy. Unlike the cultural 
public goods argument, which makes claims on public money based on market 
failure, the claims of the innovation system - like other infrastructural investments 
such as transport, R&D and education - are based on enhanced future economic 
growth (Potts et al, 2008; Potts and Cunningham, 2008)).  
 
Creative consumption and production flow into one another. Creative/ symbolic 
inputs now feed into ever more service and manufacturing goods, going beyond 
advertising into the design of the product from physical entity through customer 
service through to global brand positioning. From this perspective the DCMS’ 
emphasis on the exploitation of intellectual property, and its subsequent policy roll-
out within fairly traditional cultural industrial parameters, failed to grasp the full 
import of this new discourse for national economic competitiveness. The input of 
creative consumers is now increasingly central to the concerns of cultural, service and 
manufacturing sectors; creative producers are increasingly likely to work outside the 
creative industries proper (i.e. in the DCMS’ sense), adding value in business to 
business services right across the economy. Not only does creativity becomes the 
central resource of the post-industrial creative economy but the creative industries in 
this expanded sense operate as an information and co-ordination system within which 
new forms of symbolic production and consumption are organised. 
 
From this second perspective, the creative industries are now located within the wider 
discourse of innovation and competitiveness in the ‘post-industrial’ or ‘knowledge’ 
society. Despite invocations of a ubiquitous creativity animating all aspects of 
  
economic and social life, these specifically ‘creative industries’ still act as exemplars 
and primary generators of this new resource. This narrative shift has had great 
rhetorical power and provided enhanced access for those with creative industry 
credentials within local and national policy making (as it was always intended to do).  
 
A key aspect of the creative industries discourse is that it moves beyond the 
arguments for the ‘economic importance of culture’ and suggests that they represent a 
new kind of industry (or post-industry), a new kind of economy and a new source of 
comparative advantage. That is, they are inserted within a narrative of post-industrial 
development very much attuned to the specific histories of western developed 
countries. This is both a source of attraction for the other developed and newly 
developing countries but also problematic. The creative industries for some are a new 
high value sector signaling an important next step in economic development. For 
others they bring a charge of bottom-up culture, challenging the established cultural 
elites and opening up space for small producers. More generally they have the air of 
the new, the modern, the future. But this is a story with long provenance –it is a story 
of catching up with the West, of querying the validity of local traditions and cultures, 
of being offered liberation in a language unknown, of being caught up in somebody 
else’s universal history. It is the story of global modernity.  
 
China: No Through Road 
 
How then are we to understand the creative industries agenda in China? I will look at 
two contrasting accounts. The first is a more standard account which suggests that 
China is incapable of developing creative industries without political reform - 
political reform that includes the development of civil society, free markets and a 
cultural openness associated with western modernity. The second suggests that the 
creative industries can act as a Trojan horse, provoking social, cultural and political 
change via their introduction as a new economic agenda. We look at this argument 
from the perspective of creative consumption and then creative production. 
 
The first perspective is exemplified by Hutton’s The Writing on the Wall (2007) 
which suggests that China’s economic modernization is only half achieved. State-led 
capitalism has spurred rapid economic growth but this is about to come apart because 
the polity has not been reformed on western lines. We will not discuss the specific 
claims about the economic crisis Hutton suggests is about to hit China (he was writing 
before West was hit by one of its own) but try to outline the overall argument insofar 
as it pertains to the underpinning narrative for the creative industries. 
 
Hutton’s historical argument is straightforward. Western capitalism became globally 
dominant because it grew up in conjunction with ‘Enlightenment values’. These 
values emerged out of a new public sphere mediating between the state and the 
individual. This allowed a free circulation of knowledge and the contestation of 
tradition; the rule of law facilitating new forms of property, trade and finance; and the 
increasing restraints on the action of states by ‘opinion’, demanding that its actions 
should be rationally justified. The emergence and global success of European 
capitalism is absolutely inseparable from these Enlightenment values and it is they 
that made the difference when the European system encountered the powerful Qing 
Empire in the early nineteenth century.  
 
  
These four elements – the pluralism developed by nearly continual war and state 
competition; profitable long-distance trade and the companies it created; a 
robust soft institutional infrastructure; and the universalisation of technology – 
kindled Europe’s miracle and allowed it to overtake China…. Uniting, 
underpinning, and embodying all four elements was the Enlightenment, and the 
public institutions it underwrote. (Hutton 2007: 58)  
 
Crucially, China is lacking not just Enlightenment values but ‘Enlightenment 
attitudes’ (Hutton 2007: 51). The separation of state and society, the accountability of 
the latter to the ‘reasoned collective judgement’ (Hutton 2007: 170) of the former is 
the essence of Enlightenment, and this public sphere also underpins ‘good economy 
and society’ (Hutton 2007: 170). These are non-market institutions which allow the 
market to be so successful because they link it to the aspirations of the individual to 
‘substantive freedom and the capacity “to choose a life that one has reason to value” ’ 
(Hutton 2007: 171).  
 
 So here is the mechanism, plural public institutions; and here is a 
consequence, human happiness. Enlightenment institutions need Enlightenment 
people to breath life into them; modernity has to be won by real people who are 
prepared to imagine a life that they themselves want to make and are prepared 
to act on that concept, leaving behind the universe in which preferences are 
inherited and fixed…. [T]his involves a mental shift from the traditional to the 
modern. (Hutton 2007: 171)  
 
For Hutton it is the knowledge economy that will continue to represent the West’s 
great advantage – not just the ‘hard knowledge’ of science and technology skills 
(which is now more easily acquired by countries such as China) but ‘soft knowledge’:  
 
 … the bundle of less tangible production inputs involving leadership, 
communication, emotional intelligence, the disposition to innovate, and the 
creation of social capital that harnesses hard knowledge and permits its effective 
embodiment in good and services and – crucially – its customisation. Their 
interaction and combination are at the heart of the knowledge economy. (Hutton 
2007: 311) 
 
Soft knowledge, soft skills – what he calls ‘tacit interactions’ – are central to the 
knowledge economy; it is these which will continue to give the West its edge. These 
skills in turn rest, for Hutton, on a shift to Ingleharts’s ‘post-materialist’ values that 
we noted above. Creative industries then, like the knowledge economy as a whole, 
demand a cultural as well as a political transformation in China. One is not possible 
without the other but both are related to a wider set of ‘enlightenment values’ within 
which economic growth has to be framed. 
 
Hutton makes clear what is often only implicit in the consultancy literature on 
creative industries in China. Imitation, corruption, cronyism (guanxi), political before 
business considerations, lack of public debate, an uncreative education system and, of 
course, censorship are all seen to be obstacles to the development of a creative 
economy. But for Hutton, no amount of exhortation to be more creative will work 
unless the Chinese political system and the culture which it sustains are changed. This 
change will represent a transition to a complete modernity, a final break from the 
  
Chinese past and a full embrace of those universal values derived from the European 
Enlightenment which alone can underpin the global community.  
 
These are very big claims and which have challenged elsewhere (O’Connor, 2009b). 
The key problem is the way in which Hutton repeats many of the discourses, not just 
of western-centric developmentalism but of classic imperialism (a word that barely 
appears in his text) without a blink. Rather than bringing ‘civilization’ Hutton brings 
us ‘enlightenment capitalism’. It is a restatement of the classic liberal thesis that 
capitalism and democracy are inseparable. But now this link rests not on the growing 
demands of a rising capitalist class but on the centrality of the open circulation of 
knowledge to contemporary economic productivity. China can get so far by copying 
western industrial and technical knowledge but in its current state it will not be able to 
become a mature knowledge intensive economy. Despite the fact that the main 
purpose of the book is to convince the USA not to abandon enlightenment values 
(which he suggests is an immanent possibility) Hutton never considers the 
contradictions between enlightenment and capitalism that have been a constant theme 
within western (and anti-colonial) thought for 200 years. This reached a breaking 
point in the experience of imperialism where economic and military violence took 
place precisely under the banner of enlightened civilisation. Hutton, following 
economists such as Mokyr (2002), sees the knowledge produced by enlightenment 
and that required for the expansion of capitalism, as one and the same thing. This 
contradicts an argument implicit in Hutton’s thesis that, just as there are different 
forms of economic growth, and there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ capitalisms. Rather than 
make a claim for the validity of enlightenment values per se he argues that they 
represent the competitive advantage of a western knowledge economy. By melding 
the two sets of knowledges and values his approach runs into problems when ‘bad 
capitalism’ seems like a good option. Which is his take on the current US scene! 
 
The other aspect of Hutton’s thesis is that it completely disempowers the specific 
socio-cultural resources available to produce endogenous change in China. It must 
catch-up with the West by adopting its values and the main mechanism for this is the 
USA using its authority to coax China into the community of enlightened nations 
(O’Connor, 2009b). I will return to this at the end. 
 
Trojan Horse 
 
For the second perspective I draw on the work of the CCI at Queensland University of 
Technology1. This approach agrees in large part with Hutton’s account of the 
knowledge economy but is much more circumspect about ‘enlightenment values’. 
They do not see democratic institutions and civil society as necessary preconditions 
for the knowledge economy or creative industries. To the contrary, they suggest that 
the economic promise represented by the creative industries agenda can of itself 
produce the socio-cultural shifts and autonomous democratic spaces which Hutton 
sees as foundational. Their starting point is the most obvious failing of Hutton’s thesis 
– that in fact the Chinese government are right now adopting the creative industries as 
a new development agenda. 
 
                                                 
1 ARC Centre for Creative Industries and Innovation. http://www.cci.edu.au/about/ For a more detailed 
critique see O’Connor 2009a 
  
On the surface its adoption is fairly clear in intent. The term ‘creative industries’ was 
from the first linked to that agenda of a post-industrial knowledge economy where 
creativity will be at a premium. China – like many other Asian countries – is looking 
to move towards higher value knowledge intensive industries, and the creative 
industries landed at the right time. There is little doubt that it was the DCMS Mapping 
Document which was the catalyst for this process ( O’Connor and Gu, 2005; Hui, 
2006; Kong et al, 2006; Keane, 2007; Cunningham, 2009). The document positioned 
the creative industries squarely within the knowledge economy with its emphasis on 
‘the generation of wealth through the exploitation of intellectual property’. This 
emphasis was underlined by the subsequent success of John Howkin’s Creative 
Economy (2001) in China and his enthronement as ‘father of the creative industries’ 
in that country. Hong Kong first picked the term up in 2002; Shanghai were itching to 
use it almost immediately afterwards but had to wait until 2005; Beijing’s new 
Choayang cultural district wanted to use it but were hesitant and eventually settled on 
the hybrid cultural creative industries (Hui, 2006; Keane, 2007).  
 
Keane’s (2007) account of this gradual shift from cultural to creative is structured 
around the shift from ‘made in China’ to ‘created in China’, a shift from industrial to 
post-industrial and from derivative to original products that both requires and 
provokes a mobilisation of creativity – all under the heading of ‘the new great leap 
forward’. Ignoring the irony of the ‘great leap’ (the original ending in unmitigated 
catastrophe) the envisaged outcomes are somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand it 
offers the economic promise of a knowledge intensive industry with creative ‘spill-
overs’ into other sectors. But for the creative economy to happen – here is the Trojan 
Horse - it will necessarily have to empower both producers and consumers at grass 
roots level. There is a political promise which is left mostly implicit; the new spaces 
within which creative production and consumption take place are necessarily 
progressive and democratic. However, I suggest that the reason this wider political 
promise remains mostly implicit is not a cautious nod to the fiction of the Trojan 
Horse but a testimony to the severe limitations of the politics of the creative 
industries. 
 
In Keane’s narrative the hesitations of the Beijing municipal and national 
governments over the new term was a sign of political caution and cultural 
conservatism which must sooner or later give way. ‘Cultural industries’ as a policy 
term had been adopted in China in the late 1990s and represented an aspiration both to 
develop these sectors – film, television, publishing, performing arts, crafts, tourism 
etc. – economically and to retain control over content. It did both through an 
industrial strategy aimed at ‘controlling the big, letting go the small’. It initiated a 
process of agglomeration and partial privatisation – building national champions such 
as CCTV or the Xinhua publishing company – whilst keeping control over content via 
part-ownership and various formal and informal regulatory mechanisms. The cultural 
industries were thus not just any industry but part of the ideological formation of the 
People’s Republic. What opened new possibilities was the shift away from such 
ideology rich programming towards popular entertainment and new, ‘up-market’ 
forms of identity consumption and its attendant marketing. The expansion of the 
television market (still overwhelmingly the central media form in China, as 
elsewhere) and the need to make an operating profit saw the import of programmes 
from Korea, Taiwan and Japan and formats from across the globe. New digital genres 
such as computer games, the spread of the internet and mobile phones, as well as the 
  
proliferation of department stores, public advertising space, tourism, urban 
consumption spaces and so on, represented huge new markets. In order to fully 
compete in and take advantage of these new markets, it is argued, the government will 
need to mobilise creative talent; such ‘autonomous innovation’ as Hu Jintao called it, 
necessarily involves a diminishing of central control over the circulation of 
knowledge and the socio-cultural spaces of innovative practice.  
 
Keane’s account was linked to a wider CCI initiative whose central hypothesis was: 
 
that the internationalization of the creative industries would prove 
transformative in China, encouraging the growth of individual talent, ‘‘content’’ 
innovation, and a shift from centrally planned command-and-control industries 
to a complex dynamic system growing via the self-organized interactions of 
myriad creative agents (Hartley and Montgomery, 2010:10) 
 
‘Creative agency’ then is a driver of economic change and also of political change 
‘though possibly at a slower rate’ (Hartley and Montgomery, 2010:10). They share 
with Hutton the emphasis on the centrality of knowledge accumulation and retention 
to economic growth, but rather than a set of explicit political values they stress the 
‘evolutionary process of the growth of knowledge’ (Hartley and Montgomery, 
2010:10). Unlike Hutton, who sees the institutional setting as blocking such a process, 
the CCI school see this as more or less inevitable.  
 
Though CCI refute the primacy of the economy over culture as ‘a left over Marxist 
causality’ (Hartley and Montgomery, 2010: 9) and allow great agency to autonomous 
political intervention – such as Deng’s decision to launch the ‘opening up’ process – 
they seem unconcerned about the ability of the political structure to stand against the 
evolutionary tide of the knowledge economy. For example, as Keane (2007) clearly 
outlines, the Chinese government make a clear distinction between cultural and 
creative industries, one that is replicated right down to local city level. The former do 
not just include heritage, crafts and the arts but ‘content’ that is deemed ideologically 
sensitive such as news and information media, publishing, television drama and so on. 
That is, the very heart of the information and communication system. The creative 
industries are designated as ‘safe’ – certain forms of entertainment, design, fashion, 
computer games, software, animation, advertising, marketing and related consultancy 
services. In making such a distinction, and allocating resources, responsibilities and 
regulations accordingly, ‘politics’ reaches into the very heart of the creative economy. 
 
Yet CCI take pains to distinguish itself from the ‘political economy’ school of media 
and cultural studies, which concern themselves with the ‘various injustices’ of the 
system rather than looking at media’s contribution to economic growth (Potts, 2010: 
98). According to CCI the focus on censorship and state control (Hartley and 
Montgomery, 2010:3) or the power of the big international media (Keane, 2007:5) has 
made them blind to the development of the creative economy in China. In Keane, 
long involved in Chinese media studies, this can be a valid point about western 
observers’ over-emphasis on political censorship; but it shades into a sense that these 
concerns are irrelevant or indeed illegitimate. Yet their absence makes the CCI 
account increasingly problematic. 
 
There are two dimensions of this transformative creative agency – that of creative 
  
consumption and creative production. 
 
Creative Consumption 
 
Potts argues that the political economy approach ignores the ‘information and 
coordination services provided by cultural, creative and communications industries’ 
(2010: 96) by which he means the complex feedback mechanisms between producers 
and consumers in a service economy in which price information is volatile and 
uncertain. In short, their ability to help assemble a knowledge intensive consumer 
economy based on identity goods. This is why they are more important than their 
direct employment consequences: 
 
the film, television, video, publishing sectors serve an important function 
beyond providing journalistic information and analysis, consumer 
entertainment, and in delivering an audience for advertisers. But in a growing 
economy with increasing social mobility and opportunity, they also play a role 
in shaping and stabilizing shifting identities and aspirations (98). 
 
Keane also suggests that: 
 
The ‘old’ mass media (television, press) remain under tight control and are 
barred from foreign investment. On the other hand periodicals, magazines, 
animation, video games and mobile content applications are diversifying their 
market scope, targeting niche markets more than mass consumption, and finding 
ways to respond to their most valued demographic, the urban youth market. 
(2007:5) 
 
That is, the ideological content associated with old media and ‘citizen formation’ is 
now irrelevant; the ostensibly ‘safe’ creative industries can, under the radar, ‘shape 
and stabilize’ the socio-cultural changes experienced in the West since the 1960s and 
now much more rapidly. As Hartley and Montgomery put it: 
 
consumers armed with information about how to navigate the complex choices 
offered to them are finding opportunities to consume ‘‘entrepreneurially’’ – to 
maximize the status benefits associated with their purchases, to forge and 
express identities that express the values of “risk culture”, and thereby to 
explore the ways in which commercial offerings might be applied or adapted to 
their own needs and circumstances”.  (2010:10) 
 
Thus the ‘self-organized interactions of myriad creative agents’ manifested in the 
emerging creative industries thus represents an evolutionary process to which 
outmoded institutions will have to adapt. However, contrary to the way it is presented 
by CCI, the foundational premise of the political economy school is that the ‘cultural, 
creative and communications industries’ produce commodities first and foremost, 
which must appeal to audiences to make money and often do so in direct 
contradiction to the ideological wishes or even legal structures of the state (Garnham, 
1990; Hesmondhalgh, 2007). CCI equates the cultural commodity market with pure 
consumer sovereignty and see it as a transparent expression of individual and group 
aspirations and identities. It grows out of a hotly contested interpretation of the 
‘creative consumer’ (Hartley, 1999) and an ‘internet optimism’ (cf. Turner, 2010: 
  
Ch.5) which combines elements of community politics with Randian right-wing free-
market anarchism. Not only does this approach ignore the ways in which capitalism 
systematically distorts markets in search of profit but also the ways in which the state 
continues to frame these consumption choices – for good or bad.  
 
This is patently clear in the China case where the programme of social and political 
transformation through creative consumption amounts to the most naïve wishful 
thinking. In effect it is a version of the classical liberal claim that the rising middle 
class will begin to demand its political rights, if only to better secure its economic 
rights. Here the long awaited Chinese middle classes – those with education, leisure 
and disposable income - are the harbingers of creative consumption. These, or at least 
their youthful off-spring are positioned alongside those post-1989 popular 
revolutions, where students and professional middle classes demand access to the 
consumption rights the rest of the world takes for granted. If regimes are unable to 
supply this then they loose legitimacy. However, the standard thesis on post-1989 
China has been that political radicalism of the 1980s was bought off by the economic 
growth of the 1990s. That is, enhanced consumption was a way of staving off political 
demands.  
 
The distinction the Chinese government makes between cultural and creative 
industries is not some conservative finger-in-dyke before the inevitable flood of the 
creative economy, it is part of its active construction of a consumer economy that is 
channelled into the safety of ‘identity’ consumption. The Chinese state has the means 
and the legitimacy to intervene in the cultural commodity market to an extent far 
beyond what is possible in the West. The recent victory of the partly state owned Bai 
Du over Google is merely one indication of this. Potts’ claim that the creative 
industries ‘also play a role in shaping and stabilizing shifting identities and 
aspirations’ turns out to be correct, though not necessarily in the way he intended. 
 
It remains to be seen how the contradictions between the political requirements of the 
state and the dynamics of the cultural commodities market turn out. Keane’s 
distinction of ‘mass’ and ‘niche’ consumption turns on the opposition of ‘old’ and 
‘new’ media. But they also may also turn on that of mainstream and disruptive or 
dissenting consumption. I say may because, as we know, post-fordism is precisely 
about the production of difference and niche. For niche consumption to mean 
anything other than discerning consumption – to become dissenting or disruptive - we 
would have to know more about the social, cultural and political values involved, 
which this particular approach to creative industries does not do. 
 
The main sites of political conflict in China remain in the realm of ‘sensitive’ 
information or unacceptable symbolic content. The safe zones of identity 
consumption remain just that unless they abut against these more sensitive areas. The 
transformation of lifestyles is of major importance to our understanding of the 
prospects for contemporary China, but for real political change to occur citizen-
consumers will need to actively challenge the structures of power, symbolically or in 
practice. That is, be more citizens than consumers. But if it seems unlikely that this 
political challenge will emerge amongst readers of Vogue, then maybe it will come 
from the cultural producers themselves? 
 
Good and Bad Capitalism. 
  
 
Michael Keane writes:  
 
China’s next ‘stage of development’ may see its cultural producers 
successfully targeting regional and international markets. In order to achieve 
this, however, there is a need for Chinse cultural and media industries to break 
free of institutional and political shackles. (2007:5) 
 
The classic liberal schema whereby the growth of capitalism led to a new middle class 
demanding democratic freedoms informed capitalist development theory up to the 
1960s (Barrington Moore, 1966). From the 1970s this symbiosis seems to come apart. 
On the one hand many Latin American countries adopted capitalism with very little – 
if any - democracy and little social improvement. On the other the ‘Asian Tigers’ 
promoted a highly competitive and socially re-distributive capitalism within highly 
restricted democracies. Though the situation is complex there is a clear problem with 
linking capitalism directly with democracy.  
 
A variant of this debate concerns the role of the entrepreneur within these different 
capitalisms. Many, though somewhat loosening the direct ties between capitalism and 
democracy, argue that the high participation of entrepreneurs and small businesses 
within market economies will produce a more equitable distribution of wealth, as well 
as a more productive and innovative economy. There are good and bad capitalisms2. 
China represents a real challenge. It has achieved unprecedented economic growth 
and seems set (pace Hutton) to become an economic counter-weight to the USA. It 
certainly is not democratic; the question is, does it provide space for entrepreneurs 
and small businesses. Is it good capitalism or bad? 
 
Huang’s (2008) findings are extremely interesting. His detailed investigation 
concludes that the space opened up for small scale rural entrepreneurs in the 1980s 
produced huge economic and social welfare benefits. But in the 1990s entrepreneurs 
were squeezed out by the industrial growth strategy which favoured high levels of 
state and foreign investment in companies heavily controlled by the state. ‘Control the 
big and let go the small’ meant much closer regulation of this entrepreneurial sector 
and its diminishing economic significance – something that, despite the image, has 
continued to this day. Huang (echoing Hutton) links this to low levels of productivity 
and innovation in China and a rapidly escalating social polarisation as increased GDP 
is retained by elites3. Another study (Tsai, 2007) more directly looks at the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and the state, arguing unsurprisingly that they do 
not directly challenge the local state and spend a lot of time trimming their strategies 
to accommodate its moves, though they can sometimes achieve incremental change 
(Tsai, 2006).  
 
We cannot comment on the implications of these findings for the Chinese economy as 
a whole but given the reliance of the creative industries discourse on the emergence of 
small entrepreneurs and autonomous innovation they present some real challenges. 
                                                 
2 The literature is obviously huge. See the discussions in the works of Huang (2008) and Tsai (2006; 
2007) discussed below. 
3 Andreas (2010) disputes Huang’s ‘free market liberal’ interpretation but not the concentration of 
capital and political power in the 1990s. 
 
  
Can there be good and bad creative industries? One obvious answer is to point to the 
role of China and other developing economies in providing routine processing for the 
creative economies of the West – what Miller (2001) calls the ‘new international 
division of cultural labour’. These tendencies are also echoed in Ross’s account of 
new media workers in China (2006; 2009). That is, that large creative industries are 
using cultural workers for sweat labour. 
 
Keane’s ‘great leap forward’ suggests that China would miss real economic growth if 
it continued at this low value ‘routine processing’ level, and he suggests how it might 
escape this trap through the enhanced role of autonomous creativity and thus more 
space for entrepreneurial agents. National, provincial and city governments are now 
promoting cultural and creative industries but, as Keane argues, these are 
characterised by the duplication of production, imitation, repetitive sub-contracting, 
over-bureaucratisation and the locking up of guanxi networks around government 
officials. That is, a lack of autonomous learning networks essential to a creative 
milieu.  
 
It is however conceivable that learning effects do exist but do not necessarily translate 
into the independent start-ups that characterise the West. They may be recouped 
within the state controlled sector. The ways in which local officials in Shanghai, for 
example, were able to learn the knowledge, protocols and language appropriate to 
international contemporary art suggest the Chinese state has very effective learning 
(Zhong, 2009). The organisation of the Beijing Olympics and Shanghai Expo 
mobilised design and events management skills at the highest levels. Keane’s 
suggestion that cultural and media industries need to break free of institutional 
shackles seems less likely than that they pursue their goals via state gatekeepers, and 
hoping to ‘educate’ these officials as they go (Watterson, 2010).  
 
We might return here to the concept of ‘creative class’ which gained some currency in 
Hong Kong but less so in mainland China (Florida, 2002; Hui, 2006; Keane, 2007). 
One issue in Hong Kong was the ‘tolerance’ that, with ‘technology’ and ‘talent’, 
made up Florida’s ‘three Ts’ . The association of ‘tolerance’ with bohemian and gay 
lifestyles was dropped. Given the close connection between these values and the 
wider narrative of the ‘culturalisation of the economy’ we discussed above this is 
significant. What we have is a creative class without any semblance of the cultural 
radicalism that gave Florida’s portrait its cool edginess. The Chinese government of 
course did not like the idea of a ‘class’ but seem perfectly at home with a ‘social 
group’ possessing the requisite talent and creativity to work within a highly controlled 
creative industries sector. Without the cultural radicalism associated with its western 
counterparts (however attenuated) and with access to domestic and international 
markets necessarily dependent on state gate-keepers there seems little reason to 
expect any political or institutional shackle-breaking in the near future.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This is not to say that the growth of cultural production and consumption lacks any 
emancipatory thrust because it does not look like the West. Keane’s detailed 
knowledge of the Chinese context makes him wary of such western-centric views as 
evidenced in Hutton. Under the grand claims for the creative industries lies some 
nuanced and instructive insights into the specific contexts within which creative 
  
industries are situated and how these differences are not therefore ‘backwards’. An 
example is his attempt to produce a different account of Chinese creativity based on 
modularity and incremental change rather than the originality and even iconoclasm of 
the western tradition (Keane, 2010). These specificities are not however to be seen in 
the same way as Jacques’ recent work (200), which argues for a Chinese modernity 
radically different, and indeed indifferent, to western modernity. I would situate these 
issues within a ‘singular modernity’, one not based on the universal validity of the 
western experience, but in which western experience has become itself merely one 
particular experience (Jameson, 2002). But modernity – those sets of transformations 
associated first with Europe, though partially present in other previous historical 
formations – is now a global experience and the values with which it is assessed are 
still marked by its enlightenment origins of individual autonomy within a collective 
somehow responsible to these individuals4.  
 
Hutton’s claim that China cannot develop a knowledge economy without western 
values and institutions, despite its severe limitations, at least has the benefit of 
bringing economic growth under the rubric of social and political values (even though 
this is justified in terms of even more growth). The CCI claim that the evolutionary 
system of creative consumption and production can produce social and political 
change. I have tried to suggest some of the limitations of this thesis as it applies to 
China. I have also suggested that the creative industries discourse has tended to 
uncouple itself from the more radical social, cultural and political values of a previous 
cultural industries discourse and rooted in urban popular cultures and new social 
movements. As such it has little to it has to say about a state that enables a creative 
economy as long as it does not challenge the political system. Seeing no contradiction 
between cultural and market value, between the citizen and the consumer, between an 
economic system and the wider social values within which it is framed, this discourse 
can only offer technocratic support to a creative economy in the belief that the system 
will eventually evolve.  
 
In conclusion I suggest that we need to use a grounded and forward-looking political 
economy approach, one that recognises that there can be clear differences between the 
dynamics of actual economic growth and the social, political and ethical claims of 
‘knowledge’. Indeed that these latter might find good grounds to frame and even 
constrain the former. The emergence of a critical but positive notion of cultural 
industries in academia and policy from the 1960s (which it shared in part with cultural 
studies) was part of this contestation and renegotiation of the values of autonomy and 
democracy from within the field of culture (O’Connor, 2011). The reduction of this 
programme to a co-ordination and information system for a consumer economy can 
only be regressive. 
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